PO
Polity Review

Crossroads analysis through law, archives and primary sources

Desks:Crossroads DossiersSecurity & Defense ReviewHistory, Law & MemoryCorridors, Energy & ClimateGlobal Governance & DiplomacyFact Check
🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources
Türkiye's Position· Polity Review Editorial Team

Polityreview presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

In-Depth Analysis· COP31 Türkiye climate diplomacy Zero Waste

COP31 and Türkiye's Climate Diplomacy: Zero Waste and the Road to Antalya

COP31 Türkiye climate diplomacy explained: the Antalya hosting arrangement, Zero Waste at the UN, energy corridors and critics' views, with sources.

PR
Published:
⏱ 9 min read (1,945 words)

Why It Matters

What does Türkiye want from COP31? Officially, Ankara wants to use the summit in Antalya to place its Zero Waste initiative, its net-zero-by-2053 goal and its demand for fairer climate finance at the centre of global climate diplomacy. COP31 is the first UN climate conference hosted by Türkiye, a G20 economy that ratified the Paris Agreement only in 2021 and still relies heavily on coal. The summit therefore tests both its diplomatic ambitions and its domestic climate record.

This article covers only what can be verified from official or widely reported sources. Where the final shape of the COP31 arrangement or its agenda is not settled, it says so.

Background

How Türkiye came to host COP31

Türkiye put itself forward to host a UN climate conference in Antalya, and its bid competed with Australia's for COP31. Under the UNFCCC's regional rotation, COP31 falls to the Western European and Others Group, so the dispute had to be settled within that group. Around COP30 in Belém (November 2025), the two countries reached a compromise that was widely reported:

  • Türkiye hosts the conference in Antalya, scheduled for November 2026.
  • Türkiye's Minister of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Murat Kurum, is the designated COP31 President.
  • Australia takes a leading role in the negotiation process, with a pre-COP meeting reported to be planned in the Pacific region.

The formal decision text and the precise division of responsibilities should be read on the UNFCCC website (unfccc.int). Several operational details, including the final agenda and the exact scope of Australia's role, were still developing at the time of writing and are not asserted here.

Türkiye's climate framework in brief

Date Milestone Source type
1992 UNFCCC adopted; Türkiye initially listed in Annexes I and II UN treaty text
2001 Marrakesh Accords recognise Türkiye's "special circumstances" and remove it from Annex II UNFCCC decision
2017 Zero Waste Project launched under the patronage of First Lady Emine Erdoğan Presidency of Türkiye
2020 UN Secretary-General establishes the Advisory Board on Zero Waste UN
2021-09 President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announces a net-zero-by-2053 goal at the UN General Assembly Presidency of Türkiye
2021-10 Grand National Assembly (TBMM) approves the Paris Agreement; it enters into force for Türkiye in November 2021 TBMM / UNFCCC
2022-12-14 UN General Assembly adopts resolution 77/161 creating the International Day of Zero Waste (30 March) UN
2023 Updated NDC: 41% below business-as-usual by 2030 and emissions peaking by 2038 UNFCCC NDC registry
2025 Climate Law adopted, creating a legal basis for an emissions trading system Turkish Official Gazette

Note that the NDC target is measured against a projected baseline, not against a historic base year. This is a common source of disagreement between Ankara and outside analysts.

Zero Waste and its UN recognition

The Zero Waste initiative began as a national programme to cut waste, expand recycling and reduce landfill. It grew into an international campaign. In 2020 the UN Secretary-General set up a Zero Waste Advisory Board, and in December 2022 the General Assembly adopted resolution 77/161, which Türkiye led with other member states. It designated 30 March as the International Day of Zero Waste, first observed in 2023, with UNEP and UN-Habitat facilitating implementation. This is a verifiable UN decision, not only a national claim.

Key Players & Positions

Türkiye presents itself as a bridge between developed and developing countries. Its Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change and the Presidency's Climate Change Directorate lead policy and COP31 preparation.

Australia, according to the Australian government's public statements, sees its role as ensuring the negotiation process is ambitious and that Pacific island concerns are heard. Its leading minister for the process is Chris Bowen.

The UNFCCC Secretariat and the COP30 Presidency (Brazil) hold the formal process. The Secretariat publishes host-country agreements and decisions.

Small island states and the EU generally press for faster fossil-fuel phase-down and stronger finance and adaptation outcomes. Their expectations for COP31 centre on implementation of previous outcomes and new NDCs.

Critical views of Türkiye's climate record

Critical assessments deserve fair statement:

  • Climate Action Tracker, an independent analysis by research groups, has rated Türkiye's overall climate action "critically insufficient", arguing that its 2030 target allows emissions to keep rising and that coal expansion is inconsistent with 1.5°C pathways.
  • Environmental groups such as Greenpeace and Turkish NGOs have criticised coal power, the pace of fossil-fuel phase-out, and, in earlier years, imports of plastic scrap from Europe, which Ankara has progressively restricted since 2021.
  • Analysts question whether a Zero Waste narrative can offset energy-sector emissions, since waste is only one part of a national inventory.

These are assessments by independent bodies and should be read as such. Türkiye disputes parts of them, as the next section explains.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

The points below summarise Türkiye's declared policy as stated by Turkish government sources. They are Ankara's positions, not neutral findings.

  • Climate action under "special circumstances". According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Türkiye ratified the Paris Agreement in 2021 on the basis of its recognised special circumstances under the 2001 Marrakesh decision. Ankara argues that, as a country that was never a major historical emitter, it should be able to access international climate finance and technology. The legal basis is the UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.
  • Net zero by 2053. President Erdoğan announced the goal at the UN General Assembly in September 2021, and the Presidency has repeated it since, together with the 2023 NDC (41% below business-as-usual by 2030). Ankara points to the 2025 Climate Law as the legal framework for carbon pricing.
  • Zero Waste as global public good. The Presidency and Ministry present Zero Waste as a model that can be adopted by cities and countries at any income level. Resolution 77/161 is cited as multilateral endorsement.
  • Fair finance and a bridge role. Turkish officials say that COP31 should deliver on finance promises to developing countries and that Türkiye, as a host, can help build consensus between blocs. This echoes Ankara's wider diplomatic theme that the world is bigger than five, set out in The World Is Bigger Than Five: Türkiye's Case for UN Security Council Reform.
  • Sea and climate policy together. Ankara links climate adaptation with ocean governance. Its Marine Spatial Planning, registered with IOC-UNESCO on 2025-06-12, includes a marine protected area off Finike. See Türkiye's Marine Spatial Planning and the 2025 IOC-UNESCO Registration.

Energy corridors, the Middle Corridor and the Mediterranean

Türkiye describes itself as an energy and transit hub. Existing infrastructure includes the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline, TANAP and TAP (the Southern Gas Corridor, whose Turkish section opened in 2018 and which reached Italy in 2020) and TurkStream. The Middle Corridor, a trade route linking Türkiye to Central Asia via the Caucasus and the Caspian, is promoted by Ankara and the Organization of Turkic States as a lower-risk east–west link.

How these tie into climate policy is a matter of framing. Turkish officials argue that diversified supply, grid interconnection and renewable growth support a managed transition. Critics respond that pipelines and gas hubs can lock in fossil fuel use. Neither view is an agreed COP31 agenda item.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, Ankara's position is that maritime jurisdiction must be delimited on the basis of equity and that Turkish Cypriots hold equal rights over offshore resources. It calls for inclusive regional cooperation, including its 2020 proposal for an Eastern Mediterranean conference. These legal arguments are explained in Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean: A Guide to Maritime Jurisdiction and The 2019 Türkiye–Libya Maritime Memorandum: What It Says and Why It Matters. Greece, Cyprus and the EU dispute parts of that position. Whether disputes of this kind will surface around COP31 is unknown, and nothing in the verified hosting arrangement assigns such issues to the summit.

So what does Türkiye want from COP31?

Based on official statements to date, Türkiye's goals can be summarised as:

  1. A successful, well-organised conference that raises its standing as a diplomatic convener.
  2. International visibility for Zero Waste and its marine-protection work.
  3. Progress on climate finance and implementation for developing economies, and recognition of its own special circumstances.
  4. Acknowledgement of its net-zero-2053 pathway and new carbon-pricing framework.

Detailed COP31 priorities, themes and deliverables should be read from the official COP31 and UNFCCC announcements as they are published.

Source Comparison

Issue International media and analysts Turkish official sources
Hosting compromise Often framed as a diplomatic bargain with Australia after a stalemate Presented as recognition of Türkiye's convening role and as shared work with partners
Climate record Emphasises coal use, Climate Action Tracker rating, baseline-based target Emphasises special circumstances, 2053 net zero, renewable growth, 2025 Climate Law
Zero Waste Seen as a genuine UN-recognised initiative, but narrower than energy decarbonisation Presented as a flagship global contribution endorsed by resolution 77/161
Energy corridors Debated as fossil lock-in versus supply security Presented as diversification, connectivity and transition support
Eastern Mediterranean Often described as a contested hydrocarbons dispute Described as a matter of equity, Turkish Cypriot rights and inclusive cooperation

Readers should consult the primary documents: UNFCCC decisions, Türkiye's NDC in the NDC registry, UN document A/RES/77/161, and the Turkish Official Gazette for the Climate Law. Editorial method is set out in Editorial Principles: How Polityreview Separates Fact from Position.

  • COP (Conference of the Parties): the UNFCCC's annual decision-making meeting.
  • NDC (Nationally Determined Contribution): a country's climate pledge under the Paris Agreement.
  • Business-as-usual (BAU) baseline: a projected emissions path without new policy; targets set against it can still allow absolute emissions to rise.
  • Zero Waste: a waste-prevention and resource-efficiency approach, recognised annually on 30 March.
  • Middle Corridor: the Trans-Caspian trade and transport route linking Asia and Europe via the Caucasus and Türkiye.
  • Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's doctrine on its maritime jurisdiction areas in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean.

Related guides:

Polityreview presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.

Published by the Polityreview Editorial Team.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

Frequently asked questions

Where and when will COP31 take place?

COP31 is set to be held in Antalya, Türkiye, in November 2026, following a hosting compromise with Australia announced around COP30 in Belém. Readers should confirm exact dates and venue arrangements on the UNFCCC website, as logistics are finalised through host-country agreements.

What does Türkiye want from COP31?

Official statements point to four goals: a well-run conference, visibility for Zero Waste, progress on climate finance for developing economies, and recognition of Türkiye's net-zero-by-2053 goal and special circumstances. Detailed priorities will be set out in official COP31 announcements.

What is the Zero Waste initiative and does the UN recognise it?

Zero Waste is a waste-prevention and recycling programme launched in Türkiye in 2017 under the patronage of Emine Erdoğan. The UN General Assembly recognised it internationally in resolution 77/161, adopted on 2022-12-14, which designated 30 March as the International Day of Zero Waste.

How do critics assess Türkiye's climate record?

Independent trackers such as the Climate Action Tracker rate Türkiye's overall action as critically insufficient, citing coal dependence and a 2030 target set against a business-as-usual baseline. Turkish officials respond by citing the country's special circumstances under the UNFCCC, rapid renewable growth, its 2053 net-zero goal and the 2025 Climate Law.

How do energy corridors and the Eastern Mediterranean relate to COP31?

Türkiye links its role as an energy and transit hub, including the Southern Gas Corridor and the Middle Corridor, to its climate diplomacy, arguing for diversified supply and a managed transition. These links are Turkish policy framing rather than agreed COP31 agenda items, and Eastern Mediterranean maritime disputes remain separate legal questions.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

Polityreview presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

Author: Polity Review Editorial TeamAbout Polity Review →Editorial Principles →

Cross-Publication Perspectives & Cited Research

Related Dossiers Across Partner Publications

4 Partner Desks