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Türkiye's Position· Polity Review Editorial Team

Polityreview presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

In-Depth Analysis· Montreux Convention Black Sea Russia Ukraine Turkey role

Montreux Convention, the Black Sea and Türkiye's Role in the Russia–Ukraine War

How the 1936 Montreux Convention governs the Turkish Straits, how Türkiye applied Article 19 in 2022, and its Black Sea grain and mediation role.

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Why It Matters

The 1936 Montreux Convention decides which warships may enter or leave the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits, and Türkiye is its custodian. On 28 February 2022, four days after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Ankara announced that it would apply Article 19, which prevents the warships of belligerent states from passing through the Straits. That decision, together with Türkiye's hosting of talks and its role in the Black Sea Grain Initiative, made Türkiye one of the few states in contact with both Moscow and Kyiv.

Can Türkiye close the Bosphorus? Not at will. In peacetime, Montreux guarantees free passage for merchant ships. Türkiye's powers to restrict warships arise only in wartime or when it considers itself threatened by imminent danger of war, as set out in Articles 19, 20 and 21.

Background

What the Montreux Convention Says

Montreux was signed on 20 July 1936 in Switzerland and entered into force on 9 November 1936. It replaced the 1923 Lausanne Straits Convention, which had demilitarized the Straits and placed them under an international commission. Montreux restored Turkish sovereign control and the right to remilitarize the Straits. Its main features are:

  • Merchant vessels (Articles 2–7): In peacetime, merchant ships of all flags enjoy freedom of transit and navigation by day and night, regardless of cargo. Türkiye may apply sanitary, safety and pilotage rules.
  • Warships of Black Sea (riparian) states: They enjoy more flexible rights than others. Capital ships above 15,000 tons may transit only individually, escorted by no more than two destroyers. Submarines may pass only to return to base or for repair.
  • Warships of non-riparian states: Their transit is subject to advance notification and tonnage limits. Their aggregate tonnage in the Black Sea is capped at 30,000 tons, which can rise to 45,000 tons in specified circumstances. A single visit may not exceed 21 days (Article 18). Aircraft carriers are not covered by the transit categories.
  • Wartime (Articles 19–21): If Türkiye is not a belligerent, warships of belligerent states may not pass, subject to narrow exceptions (Article 19). If Türkiye is a belligerent, it has discretion over warship passage (Article 20). If Türkiye considers itself threatened by imminent danger of war, it may apply similar restrictions (Article 21).

The Convention does not give Türkiye a general power to shut the Straits. Merchant passage in peacetime cannot be suspended for political reasons. The restrictions applied in 2022 concerned warships only, and they applied to all belligerents. The Article 19 wording also contains a provision on warships returning to their bases, which is why the practical effect on Russia's Black Sea Fleet was limited to vessels not registered there.

Timeline

Date Event
24 July 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and its Straits Convention
20 July 1936 Montreux Convention signed
9 November 1936 Montreux enters into force
24 February 2022 Russia launches full-scale invasion of Ukraine
28 February 2022 Türkiye announces implementation of Article 19
10 March 2022 Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers meet in Antalya on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum
29 March 2022 Russian and Ukrainian delegations hold talks in Istanbul
22 July 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative signed in Istanbul
1 August 2022 First grain ship leaves Odesa under the Initiative
17 July 2023 Russia ends its participation in the Initiative
11 January 2024 Türkiye, Romania and Bulgaria sign a Black Sea mine countermeasures arrangement
16 May 2025 Russian and Ukrainian delegations meet in Istanbul; a large prisoner exchange is agreed

The Grain Initiative

The Black Sea Grain Initiative was concluded in Istanbul on 22 July 2022 through parallel arrangements: one among Ukraine, Türkiye and the United Nations, and a separate memorandum between Russia and the UN on facilitating Russian food and fertilizer exports. A Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) in Istanbul, with UN, Turkish, Russian and Ukrainian officials, coordinated ship inspections and safe passage from Odesa, Chornomorsk and Yuzhny. By mid-2023, more than 33 million tons of grain and foodstuffs had left Ukrainian ports under the scheme. Russia declined to extend the arrangement in July 2023, saying that its own export-facilitation commitments had not been met. Ukraine, the UN and Türkiye expressed regret.

Key Players & Positions

Russia

Moscow has said it respects the Montreux regime and has pointed to the return-to-base provision. It has linked the grain arrangement to the removal of obstacles to its own agricultural and fertilizer exports, including payment and insurance channels. Russian officials have also criticized Western military support to Ukraine, including Turkish-made drones sold to Kyiv.

Ukraine

Kyiv asked Türkiye in late February 2022 to close the Straits to Russian warships. It supports consistent application of Montreux, wants the restrictions maintained for as long as the war lasts, and has repeatedly called on Türkiye to use its leverage. It also welcomed the Grain Initiative as vital to its economy and to global food security. After the 2023 collapse of the deal, Ukraine established its own shipping corridor along its coast.

NATO Allies

NATO documents describe the Black Sea as strategically important. Allies have generally accepted the Montreux regime as the framework for the region, while some eastern-flank members have urged a stronger Allied maritime presence. Montreux's tonnage and duration limits for non-riparian states constrain that presence. Bulgaria and Romania, as NATO riparian states, joined Türkiye in the mine countermeasures arrangement signed on 11 January 2024. Some Western governments and commentators have criticized Türkiye for continuing trade with Russia and not joining sanctions.

The United Nations

UN Secretary-General António Guterres and UN agencies co-signed and monitored the Grain Initiative. The General Assembly resolution of 2 March 2022 condemning the invasion was supported by Türkiye.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Presidency statements and Türkiye's UN positions, Ankara's approach rests on five points:

  • Impartial application of Montreux. Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced on 28 February 2022 that Türkiye would implement Article 19 and called on all states, riparian or not, not to send warships through the Straits. Ankara states that this applies equally to all belligerents and that returning-to-base transits are permitted by the text. The legal basis is Articles 19–21 of the 1936 Convention, which the MFA publishes on its website.
  • Territorial integrity of Ukraine. The MFA has stated that Türkiye does not recognize the annexation of Crimea and supports Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Türkiye voted for the UN General Assembly resolution of 2 March 2022 on the invasion. This follows the principle of territorial integrity in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
  • Dialogue with both sides. Türkiye hosted the Antalya ministerial meeting on 10 March 2022 and the Istanbul delegation talks of 29 March 2022. It has maintained that dialogue channels with both Moscow and Kyiv must stay open. It did not join Western sanctions on Russia, which Ankara explains as a result of its national interest and its mediation role. Presidency statements have repeatedly said Türkiye seeks a negotiated and just peace.
  • Food security and humanitarian diplomacy. Türkiye co-architected the Black Sea Grain Initiative, with the Ministry of National Defence and Turkish officials working in the Istanbul JCC. Ankara has stated its willingness to revive the arrangement. It has also facilitated detainee and prisoner exchanges and hosted Russia–Ukraine delegations in Istanbul in 2025.
  • Montreux as a stabilizing regime. Ankara argues that preserving Montreux, rather than revising it, has helped prevent naval escalation in the Black Sea. It has said Black Sea security should be built primarily by the littoral states, through arrangements such as the mine countermeasures cooperation with Romania and Bulgaria, and it opposes turning the sea into an arena of great-power rivalry.

For how Ankara's defence industry has featured in this context, see Türkiye's Defense Industry: How It Reached About 80% Domestic Production. For Türkiye's wider case for a more representative UN, see 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's Case for UN Security Council Reform.

Source Comparison

Issue Common Western/international framing Turkish primary-source framing
Article 19 decision A 'closure of the Straits' to Russia A treaty-based, impartial application to all belligerents, with the return-to-base exception
Türkiye's neutrality Balancing act or hedging between NATO and Russia Principled mediation grounded in the territorial integrity of Ukraine and in dialogue with both parties
Sanctions Criticism that Türkiye is an exit route for Russian trade National interest, mediation role and preservation of communication channels
Grain Initiative A UN-led success, with Türkiye as host A joint UN–Türkiye architecture, supported by Turkish diplomacy and the Ministry of National Defence
Black Sea security NATO presence needed; Montreux seen as a constraint Montreux as a stabilizing framework; littoral-state cooperation preferred

The difference lies mostly in emphasis. Both sets of sources agree on the text of Articles 19–21 and the facts of the grain deal. They differ on whether Türkiye's posture is best described as hedging or as principled impartiality. Readers can compare statements on the MFA website with UN and NATO documents. For how Polityreview separates fact from position, see Editorial Principles: How Polityreview Separates Fact from Position.

  • Turkish Straits: The Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles, the only maritime route between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.
  • Montreux Convention: The 1936 treaty regulating transit through the Straits. It remains in force, and Article 28 allows denunciation with two years' notice after the original twenty-year period, though no state has used it.
  • Article 19: The provision that bars warships of belligerent states from transiting when Türkiye is not at war, with narrow exceptions.
  • Riparian state: A state with a coastline on the Black Sea (Türkiye, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia).
  • Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): The Istanbul body that coordinated the Grain Initiative.

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Polityreview presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources. This article is published by the Polityreview Editorial Team.

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Frequently asked questions

Can Türkiye close the Bosphorus?

Not at will. In peacetime, the Montreux Convention guarantees free passage to merchant ships, and Türkiye may apply only safety, sanitary and pilotage rules. Türkiye may restrict warship passage in wartime or when it considers itself threatened by imminent danger of war, under Articles 19, 20 and 21.

What does Article 19 of the Montreux Convention do?

Article 19 says that when Türkiye is not a belligerent, warships of states at war may not pass through the Straits, with narrow exceptions, such as aid to a victim of aggression under certain treaties. Türkiye announced on 28 February 2022 that it would apply it to the Russia–Ukraine war. It also allows warships to return to their home bases.

Did Türkiye close the Straits only to Russia?

No. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the restriction applies to all belligerent states, and Ankara also asked non-riparian states not to send warships through the Straits. In practice, the war involves only Russia and Ukraine, and Ukraine has no fleet that could transit, so the measure primarily affected Russian vessels.

What was the Black Sea Grain Initiative?

It was a deal signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022 by Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN, with a parallel Russia–UN memorandum. A Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul supervised ships leaving Odesa, Chornomorsk and Yuzhny, and more than 33 million tons of grain and foodstuffs were exported before Russia ended its participation on 17 July 2023.

Has Türkiye joined Western sanctions on Russia?

No. Ankara has not joined the sanctions, citing its national interest and its aim to keep communication channels with both Moscow and Kyiv open. At the same time, Türkiye supports Ukraine's territorial integrity, does not recognize the annexation of Crimea and supplies Ukraine with defence equipment.

Is the Montreux Convention still in force?

Yes. It entered into force on 9 November 1936 and has remained in force since, although proposals to revise it have been discussed from time to time. Article 28 allows a party to denounce it with two years' notice after the first twenty years, but no state has done so.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

Polityreview presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

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