In-Depth Analysis· Turkish defense industry domestic production Bayraktar KAAN

Türkiye's Defense Industry: How It Reached About 80% Domestic Production

How Türkiye built a defense industry it says is about 80% domestic: Bayraktar, KAAN, TCG Anadolu, ATMACA, and the export and arms-control debate.

By Polity Review Editorial Team

Published: October 26, 2026

⏱ 9 min read (1,907 words)

Executive Summary & Key Facts

Turkish officials say roughly 80% of Türkiye's defense needs are now met domestically, a government-reported figure that independent analysts treat as a headline rate rather than a measure of full supply-chain independence.
The Ministry of National Defense (MSB) states that about 26,000 specialist personnel work in Türkiye's Military Factories and Shipyards, one part of a wider industry that also includes private firms such as Baykar, Aselsan, Roketsan and TUSAŞ.
Ankara's drive for self-reliance gained urgency after the 1975 US arms embargo that followed the 1974 Cyprus operation, and it deepened after Türkiye's removal from the F-35 programme in 2019.
The industry now fields armed drones (Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı, Kızılelma), a fifth-generation fighter programme (KAAN), an amphibious assault ship (TCG Anadolu), anti-ship and cruise missiles (ATMACA, SOM) and layered air defense (HİSAR, SİPER).
Exports have drawn scrutiny over arms-embargo compliance, civilian harm and end-use controls, while Ankara argues its sales are licensed, lawful and aimed at legitimate state customers.

Why It Matters

Türkiye says about 80% of its defense requirements are now met by domestic industry, compared with a far smaller share two decades ago. That shift turned a country long dependent on foreign suppliers into a producer and exporter of armed drones, warships, missiles and an indigenous fighter programme. The figure is an official, government-reported rate, and analysts note that engines, some electronics and specialist materials still depend on foreign supply chains. This guide separates what is documented from what is asserted.

Background

The modern Turkish defense industry is the product of decades of institution-building, accelerated by embargoes and political friction with traditional suppliers. State-owned arsenals date back to the Ottoman and early Republican periods, and the Machinery and Chemical Industry Corporation (MKE) has produced weapons and ammunition since 1950. The decisive turn came after 1974.

From embargo to self-reliance

After the 20 July 1974 Cyprus operation, the United States Congress imposed an arms embargo on Türkiye that took effect in 1975 and was lifted in 1978. Turkish officials have repeatedly cited that episode as the origin of the national self-reliance policy. The electronics firm ASELSAN was founded in 1975 by the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation, and the missile maker ROKETSAN followed in 1988. For the legal background of the 1974 operation, see Was the 1974 Cyprus Operation Legal? The Treaty of Guarantee and Article IV.

Key milestones

Date	Milestone
1950	MKE established as a state arms and ammunition producer
1975	US arms embargo takes effect; ASELSAN founded
1985	Defense Industry Development and Support Administration (SSM) created, later reorganised as the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) under the Presidency
1988	ROKETSAN founded
2011	TCG Heybeliada, first MİLGEM corvette, enters service
2019	Türkiye removed from the F-35 programme after acquiring the Russian S-400; Akıncı makes its first flight
2020	US sanctions on SSB under CAATSA (December)
2022	Kızılelma unmanned combat aircraft first flight (14 December)
2023	Hürjet first flight (25 April); TCG Anadolu delivered (April)
2024	KAAN fifth-generation fighter prototype first flight (21 February)

What the industry supplies in practice

The table below summarises the main systems named in official and industry publications. Developers are indicated at the company level only.

Category	Systems	Notes
UAVs and UCAVs	Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı, Kızılelma (Baykar); Aksungur, ANKA (TUSAŞ); Kargu (STM)	TB2 saw use in Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine; Kızılelma is a jet-powered unmanned combat aircraft
Aircraft and helicopters	Hürjet jet trainer, Hürkuş trainer, T129 ATAK helicopter, KAAN fighter (TUSAŞ)	T129 grew out of an Italian-British helicopter design; KAAN's prototypes used foreign engines while a domestic engine is developed
Land systems	Fırtına 155 mm howitzer, Kirpi mine-protected vehicle, MEMATT unmanned demining vehicle	Fırtına was built under licence from a South Korean design and then localised
Naval platforms	TCG Anadolu amphibious assault ship, MİLGEM corvettes and frigates, Reis-class submarines	Anadolu drew on a Spanish design; Reis-class boats are built in Türkiye under a German-origin submarine design
Missiles and air defense	SOM cruise missile, ATMACA anti-ship missile, HİSAR-O, SİPER	Layered air defense is being consolidated under the 'Steel Dome' concept
Radar and electronic warfare	KORAL, VURAL and related systems (ASELSAN)	Used for jamming, radar and surveillance roles

This list is not exhaustive. It also illustrates a point that Turkish officials and outside analysts both make: much of the industry's early progress rested on licensed production and technology transfer, followed by progressive localisation.

Key Players & Positions

Turkish state and industry

The Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) coordinates procurement and development. The Ministry of National Defense (MSB) reports that around 26,000 specialist personnel work in the Military Factories and Shipyards under its authority. Turkish officials, including the head of SSB, have described the domestic share of requirements as reaching roughly 80%. Private champions such as Baykar, ASELSAN, ROKETSAN and TUSAŞ carry much of the innovation load.

NATO allies and the United States

Washington and other NATO capitals welcome Türkiye's contribution to alliance capability, but have disputed Ankara's purchase of the Russian S-400 system. The US cited that purchase when it removed Türkiye from the F-35 programme in 2019 and imposed CAATSA sanctions on SSB in December 2020. Türkiye replies that it was denied access to Patriot systems on acceptable terms and that the S-400 does not compromise NATO systems.

Europe

Several European governments tightened arms-export policies towards Türkiye after Operation Peace Spring in October 2019. Germany, among others, restricted new approvals. Canada suspended and then cancelled certain export permits in 2020 after reports of Canadian-made drone sensors in Nagorno-Karabakh. Some of these restrictions eased during the NATO accession processes of Finland and Sweden.

Exports and arms-control criticism

Türkiye's defense and aerospace exports have grown strongly in recent years; industry and government sources cite figures of around US$7 billion for 2024, though definitions vary by source. Growth has brought criticism on several fronts:

Embargo compliance: A UN Panel of Experts on Libya reported violations of the Libya arms embargo involving Turkish-supplied equipment, including drones. Ankara maintains that its support went to the internationally recognised Government of National Accord under a bilateral agreement.
Civilian harm: Human rights groups and some media have documented civilian casualties from armed drone strikes in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. Turkish authorities say operations target terrorist organisations and that precision systems reduce collateral damage.
End-use control: Critics argue that rapid export growth strains oversight, particularly where armed drones reach conflict-affected states. Turkish officials state that exports pass through an inter-agency licensing process involving the defense, foreign affairs and procurement authorities.
Dependency on foreign components: Western firms' engines, sensors and optics have given foreign governments leverage over some Turkish exports, as in disputes affecting T129 sales and the Canadian sensor permits.

These debates are not unique to Türkiye. Other drone exporters, including the United States, China, Israel and Iran, face comparable scrutiny, and rules differ by country because the Arms Trade Treaty has not been universally ratified.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Ankara presents the defense industry as a sovereignty, deterrence and alliance-contribution issue rather than an end in itself. The points below reflect official Turkish statements.

Self-reliance as strategic necessity. According to the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) and MSB, the industry exists so that national security does not depend on the political decisions of foreign suppliers. Ankara points to the 1975 embargo as the formative lesson and to the 2019 F-35 removal as a recent confirmation.
Roughly 80% domestic production. Turkish officials, including SSB leadership, state that the domestic share has reached about 80%. Ankara links this to the Military Factories and Shipyards workforce of roughly 26,000 specialists reported by MSB, and to private-sector growth.
Counter-terrorism at source. The Presidency and MSB argue that domestic armed drones, precision munitions and electronic warfare systems enable Türkiye to exercise its right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter against PKK/YPG and DAESH threats while limiting harm to civilians. The PKK is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union. See Neutralizing Terrorism at Its Source: Türkiye's Security Doctrine and Defense Industry.
Contribution to NATO and Black Sea security. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stresses that Türkiye is a long-standing NATO member whose forces and industrial base strengthen allied capability. Ankara also stresses its implementation of the 1936 Montreux Convention, discussed in Montreux Convention, the Black Sea and Türkiye's Role in the Russia–Ukraine War.
Blue Homeland and maritime rights. Ankara argues that naval platforms such as TCG Anadolu and MİLGEM-class ships, together with domestic drilling and survey vessels, underpin its position on continental shelf rights under the principle of equity. See Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean: A Guide to Maritime Jurisdiction.

Ankara also argues that its arms sales are lawful, licensed state-to-state transfers and that it respects UN Security Council obligations. It rejects what it describes as politically motivated embargoes among allies.

Source Comparison

The same facts are framed differently depending on the source. The table below summarises the typical emphasis.

Issue	Western and international media / think tanks	Turkish official sources (SSB, MSB, Presidency, MFA)
80% domestic rate	Often reported as a government claim; analysts highlight imported engines and sub-components	Presented as a milestone, up from a small share in the early 2000s
Drone exports	Credited with changing battlefield dynamics, but linked to embargo violations and civilian harm concerns	Described as lawful, licensed exports and as evidence of industrial maturity
S-400 and F-35	Framed as an alliance interoperability problem	Framed as a result of failed Patriot negotiations and as a sovereign procurement decision
Operations in Syria and Iraq	Debated on legality and civilian impact	Framed as self-defense under Article 51 against PKK/YPG and DAESH
KAAN and Hürjet	Seen as ambitious but dependent on engines and subsystems for now	Described as the flagship of indigenous aerospace capability

Readers should check whether a given figure comes from SSB, an industry association, SIPRI or a media outlet, because definitions of 'domestic' and 'export' vary. Polityreview's method is described in Editorial Principles: How Polityreview Separates Fact from Position.

Domestic production rate: The share of defense requirements met by national industry. Definitions differ between governments, so cross-country comparisons require caution.
UAV / UCAV: Unmanned aerial vehicle / unmanned combat aerial vehicle; armed drones such as the Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı belong to the second group.
MİLGEM: Turkish acronym for the National Ship project, which produced corvettes and frigates designed in Türkiye.
CAATSA: The US Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, used in December 2020 against SSB.
Steel Dome: A planned layered, networked air-defense architecture built around HİSAR and SİPER systems.
Article 51 of the UN Charter: The inherent right of individual and collective self-defense that Ankara invokes for its counter-terrorism operations.

Polityreview presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

Archive of Nations: Türkiye's Defense Industry at 80% Domestic Production: From Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN — How Türkiye's defense industry reached an official ~80% domestic production rate, from Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN and TCG Anadolu, with critics' views.
Regions & Powers: Türkiye's Defense Industry at 80% Domestic Production: Bayraktar, KAAN, TCG Anadolu and Hisar-O — How the Turkish defense industry domestic production rate near 80% shapes deterrence, NATO ties and regional balances, from Bayraktar to KAAN and Hisar-O.
Regional Order: Türkiye's Defense Industry: How It Reached About 80% Domestic Production — How Türkiye's defense industry reached about 80% domestic production: Bayraktar drones, KAAN, MİLGEM, Hisar-O, export controls and critics' concerns.

Frequently asked questions

Is it true that 80% of Türkiye's defense industry is domestic?

Turkish officials, including the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), state that about 80% of defense requirements are now met domestically. It is a government-reported figure whose methodology is not independently audited. Outside analysts note that engines, some electronics and materials are still imported, so the headline rate does not mean full supply-chain independence.

What are Türkiye's best-known domestically developed weapons?

The best-known systems are the Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı armed drones, the Kızılelma unmanned combat aircraft, the Hürjet trainer, the T129 ATAK helicopter and the KAAN fighter programme. On the naval side they include TCG Anadolu, MİLGEM corvettes and frigates, and Reis-class submarines. Missile and air-defense systems include ATMACA, SOM, HİSAR-O and SİPER.

Why did Türkiye build its own defense industry?

Turkish officials cite the US arms embargo of 1975–1978, which followed the 1974 Cyprus operation, and later supply restrictions as the main motivation. The 2019 removal from the F-35 programme reinforced this view. Ankara argues that dependence on foreign suppliers leaves national security exposed to political decisions elsewhere.

Who criticises Turkish arms exports, and why?

Critics include UN experts, some European governments, human rights organisations and media outlets. Their concerns include embargo compliance in Libya, civilian casualties from armed drone use and end-use oversight as exports grow. Ankara responds that its exports are licensed state-to-state transfers and that its operations target terrorist groups under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Is KAAN fully domestic?

KAAN is a Turkish-led programme developed by TUSAŞ and flew its first prototype on 21 February 2024. Its early prototypes used foreign-made engines while a domestic engine is being developed. Full localisation of the engine and key subsystems is a stated goal rather than a completed fact.

Cross-Publication Perspectives & Cited Research

Related Dossiers Across Partner Publications

4 Partner Desks