Two New Crossings and a 'New Proposal': What Did the 9 November Cyprus Trilateral with Holguín Decide, and Where Does the Two-State Doctrine Stand?

Why It Matters

On 9 November 2026, Turkish Cypriot President Tufan Erhürman and Greek Cypriot leader Nikos Christodoulides met UN envoy María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar in Nicosia for about four hours and, according to Reuters, agreed to open two new crossing points, coordinate emergency responses and share archival materials. These are confidence-building measures; none settles the island's political status.

Reuters described the meeting as part of a UN-backed effort to resume peace talks after nearly a decade of deadlock. Hürriyet Daily News reported that Erhürman also presented a new proposal that he said could “completely change the dynamics of the process.” The content of that proposal had not been publicly detailed in the sources reviewed, and this article does not speculate about it.

What Was Agreed on 9 November, and What Was Not

Reported as agreed (Reuters, via Al-Monitor):

• Opening two new crossing points. Media in Cyprus put the number of open crossings at 11 afterwards.
• Coordinating on emergency responses.
• Sharing archival materials.

Not reported in the sources reviewed:

• Any agreement on the island's political status or a return to formal negotiations.
• The locations and opening dates of the two new crossings.
• The substance of Erhürman's proposal.

The leaders had last met face to face on 27 October. According to Hürriyet Daily News, Holguín held separate meetings with each leader the week before the trilateral.

Why Crossings, Emergency Coordination and Shared Archives Are Confidence-Building Measures

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) are practical steps that reduce friction and build trust between parties without deciding the underlying dispute. Crossings ease movement between the two sides. Emergency coordination, for example during fires or other disasters, protects people on both sides of the divide. Shared archives support a common factual record.

A settlement of status is different. It answers who holds sovereignty, how power is shared, what international personality each people has, and what security arrangements apply. CBMs can create a better atmosphere for that discussion, but they cannot replace it.

Background

The Cyprus issue traces to the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, the December 1963 breakdown of the partnership republic, the 1974 coup and Turkish intervention, and the 1983 TRNC proclamation. Talks since 1977 have repeatedly stalled, most recently at Crans-Montana in July 2017, which frames today's “nearly a decade of deadlock.”

Key Chronological Milestones and Legal Instruments

Date	Event or instrument	Why it matters here
11 Feb 1959	Zurich and London Agreements	Basis of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus as a partnership of two peoples
1960	Treaty of Guarantee (Türkiye, Greece, UK)	Defines the guarantor powers; Article IV covers action if the settled order is breached
30 Nov 1963	Makarios's 13 constitutional amendment proposals	Would have curtailed Turkish Cypriot constitutional safeguards
21 Dec 1963	Attacks on Turkish Cypriots	Start of the partnership's collapse
30 Dec 1963	Green Line drawn in Nicosia	Origin of the dividing line crossed at today's crossing points
4 Mar 1964	UNSC Resolution 186	Ankara contests its treatment of the Greek Cypriot administration as 'the government'
15 and 20 Jul 1974	Coup in Cyprus; Turkish intervention	Türkiye cites Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee
15 Nov 1983	TRNC proclaimed	Turkish Cypriot statehood claim
24 Apr 2004	Annan Plan referendums	64.91% of Turkish Cypriots voted 'Yes'; 75.83% of Greek Cypriots voted 'No'
Jul 2017	Crans-Montana conference	Ended without agreement
Apr 2021	Geneva informal 5+UN meeting	Launched the current informal format
15 Oct 2024	New York UN trilateral meeting	No return to formal negotiations announced
9 Nov 2026	Nicosia trilateral with Holguín	Two new crossings, emergency coordination, shared archives

From the 1960 Partnership to 1974

The 1960 Republic of Cyprus was founded on the political equality of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Its guarantors were Türkiye, Greece and the United Kingdom. On 30 November 1963, Archbishop Makarios proposed 13 amendments that Turkish Cypriots saw as dismantling their safeguards, including the Vice President's veto. For a clause-by-clause reading, see the sister analysis Politi Archive: The 13 Amendments of 30 November 1963: Reading Makarios's Proposals Against the 1960 Cyprus Constitution, Clause by Clause. After the 21 December 1963 attacks, Nicosia was divided along the Green Line. Türkiye intervened on 20 July 1974 after the 15 July coup. Our explainer on the 1974 operation and Article IV sets out the treaty text and the arguments.

Federation Talks, Crans-Montana and the Decade of Deadlock

The 1977 and 1979 High-Level Agreements set a federal framework. The 2004 Annan Plan was approved by Turkish Cypriots and rejected by Greek Cypriots, yet the Greek Cypriot administration joined the EU on 1 May 2004. See our fact check on whether Turkish Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan.

The July 2017 Crans-Montana conference ended without agreement. That is why Reuters speaks of “nearly a decade of deadlock.” Each side reads the causes differently. Greek Cypriot officials have generally pointed to security and guarantee questions. Ankara argues that the Greek Cypriot side was unwilling to share power and prosperity on an equal footing.

Geneva 2021 and New York 2024

In April 2021, the informal 5+UN meeting in Geneva brought the two sides together with the three guarantor powers under UN auspices. The 15 October 2024 UN-hosted trilateral meeting in New York produced no return to formal negotiations. Ankara and the TRNC read it as confirming that there is no common ground for a federal model. For the format's mechanics, see our guide to the informal 5+UN Cyprus conference Holguín explained.

Key Players & Positions

Three seats were at the 9 November table: Turkish Cypriot President Tufan Erhürman, Greek Cypriot leader Nikos Christodoulides and UN envoy María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar. Behind them stand the guarantor powers Türkiye, Greece and the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the informal 5+UN format that began in Geneva in April 2021.

• Turkish Cypriot side: President Erhürman participates as leader of one of the island's two equal peoples. According to Hürriyet Daily News, he tabled a new proposal intended to change the dynamics of the process.
• Greek Cypriot side and Greece: The Republic of Cyprus presents itself as the internationally recognized state. Its stated goal is a settlement based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation under UN resolutions. Athens, as a guarantor power, supports that framework.
• European Union: The EU, of which the Republic of Cyprus is a member, supports a settlement within the EU framework. Ankara disputes the Union's standing to rule on maritime or status questions.
• United Kingdom: The UK is the third guarantor power under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.
• United Nations: The UN's stated aim, as Reuters reports, is to resume negotiations. Holguín's role is to convene and facilitate, not to impose.

Context Box: The Great Sea Interconnector Side Thread

On the same day, Greek government spokesman Pavlos Marinakis rejected the idea that Turkish approval is needed for the Great Sea Interconnector, the planned Greece–Cyprus electricity cable. According to Greek City Times, he said Athens holds the required authorisations and had not asked Ankara for permission. This was not part of the trilateral, and the sources reviewed do not link it to the talks.

For related background, see our analysis of Turkish Cypriot hydrocarbon rights and the Cronos gas field. The sister analysis International Politics Brief: Does the EU Have Legal Power to Rule on Türkiye's Maritime Claims? What the 4 November 2026 Enlargement Report Can and Cannot Decide covers the cable and the continental shelf.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Ankara and the TRNC welcome practical cooperation between the two peoples but argue it must proceed on the basis of equality and must not bypass the question of status. Ankara maintains that the federal model is exhausted and that a lasting settlement must begin from the sovereign equality and equal international status of the Turkish Cypriot people.

• Dialogue yes, bypassing status no. Ankara and the TRNC Presidency support steps that improve daily life, such as crossings, emergency coordination and shared archives. According to their statements, such steps must rest on equality and cannot substitute for addressing status.
• The federal model is exhausted. Ankara points to more than five decades of federation talks: the 1977 and 1979 High-Level Agreements, the 2004 Annan Plan, Crans-Montana in 2017, Geneva in 2021 and New York in 2024. It argues that a realistic settlement starts from the Turkish Cypriot people's sovereign equality and equal international status, leading to two sovereign states cooperating side by side.
• Historical and legal basis. Ankara cites the 1960 partnership republic founded on political equality and the 1963 breakdown (the 30 November 1963 amendment proposals and the 21 December 1963 attacks). It argues that UNSC Resolution 186 (4 March 1964) treated a Greek Cypriot administration that had displaced the constitutional order as 'the government,' creating a lasting asymmetry. It cites Türkiye's 1974 action under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee and the TRNC's proclamation on 15 November 1983.
• Equal rights over offshore resources. Ankara argues that Turkish Cypriots hold equal rights over the island's offshore resources, and that no energy or infrastructure project can bypass Turkish Cypriot consent or Türkiye's continental shelf rights. It points to its registration of the continental shelf outer limits with the UN in 2020 and the 12 June 2025 IOC-UNESCO registration of its Marine Spatial Planning. These are Ankara's registered position; they are not adjudicated delimitations, and other states contest them. See our Blue Homeland guide.
• An inclusive framework remains on offer. President Erdoğan's 2020 proposal for an Eastern Mediterranean Conference, including all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots, remains Ankara's offer of an inclusive regional framework.

For the full doctrine, read Cyprus issue explained: two-state solution.

Source Comparison

Reuters and Hürriyet Daily News agree on who met and that the UN hosted the 9 November trilateral. They emphasise different things: Reuters reports two new crossings, emergency coordination and shared archives; Hürriyet reports Erhürman's new proposal. Ankara's and the TRNC's stated positions link any practical step to equality and status.

Source type	'Breakthrough' vs. CBM framing	Naming of the parties	Status mentioned?
Reuters (via Al-Monitor)	Measured: agreed steps within a UN-backed effort to resume talks after nearly a decade of deadlock	'Greek Cypriot leader' and 'Turkish Cypriot leader'	Not in the excerpt reviewed
Hürriyet Daily News	Foregrounds Erhürman's proposal and his claim it could 'completely change the dynamics'	'Turkish Cypriot President' and 'Greek Cypriot leader'	Not in the excerpt reviewed; proposal content not detailed
Greek Cypriot and Greek outlets	Varies by outlet; the Greek City Times item reviewed covered the cable, not the trilateral	Typically the Republic of Cyprus framework	Federation under UN resolutions is the stated Greek Cypriot goal
Turkish and TRNC official statements	Practical cooperation welcomed as useful, not as a substitute for a settlement	'Turkish Cypriot President' and 'Turkish Cypriots' as an equal people	Yes: equality and equal international status

Where the sources agree: the meeting took place on 9 November under UN auspices with Holguín, the leaders had last met on 27 October, and the aim is to restart a stalled process.

Where they diverge: whether the steps are a stepping stone toward a federal settlement or a parallel track that leaves status open. For the sister fact checks on EU reports and maritime claims, see Mirror of States: Fact Check: Can an EU Enlargement Report Declare Türkiye's Maritime Claims 'Unlawful'? A Mirror Test of the 4 November Report Against Treaty Text and Delimitation Law. Our method is described in the Editorial Principles.

Key Terms & Related Guides

Five terms frame this meeting. Confidence-building measures are practical steps that build trust without deciding status; crossing points are openings along the Green Line, first drawn in Nicosia on 30 December 1963; guarantor powers are Türkiye, Greece and the UK; and 5+UN is the informal format launched in Geneva in April 2021.

• Confidence-building measures: Steps such as crossings, emergency coordination and archive sharing that reduce friction without resolving sovereignty or governance.
• Crossing points: Checkpoints between the two sides. Media in Cyprus count 11 open after 9 November, according to Reuters.
• Green Line (30 December 1963): The dividing line in Nicosia drawn after the 1963 violence, now the reference point for crossing-point debates.
• Guarantor powers: Türkiye, Greece and the United Kingdom under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, whose Article IV Ankara cites for its 1974 action.
• Political equality: The principle that Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots are co-founders with equal standing. Ankara argues it has never been honoured in practice since 1963.
• Informal 5+UN format: The two sides plus the three guarantors, hosted by the UN, first convened in Geneva in April 2021.

Related guides:

• Cyprus issue explained: two-state solution
• Informal 5+UN Cyprus conference Holguín explained
• Did Turkish Cypriots reject the Annan Plan 2004 referendum results?
• Treaty of Guarantee Article IV explained
• Eastern Mediterranean maritime dispute explained

Written by the Polityreview Editorial Team. Polityreview presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.